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INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution extended powers to the Judiciary branch as the third and final
branch in its creation of a government. The judiciary has the authority under the Constitution to
oversee the laws ofthe land and ensure that the other two branches (Executive and Legislative) do
not create and implement laws that are in conflict with the Constitution or Bill ofRights, which were
implemented to ensure that the government did not surpass its powers. Therefore, ahhough the
judiciary also has some built-in checks and balances, it still wields extreme power. The Constitution
also gives full faith and credit to the laws ofeach state and allows each state to make its own statutes

in addition to the federal statutes which often leads to many different laws and controlling legislation
within each state of the country in entirety. Laws may vary greatly from state to state as each state
defines its own way ofdoing things. This is true of the manner of selection ofjudges, the overseers
•

ofthe significant power of the judiciary branch ofeach state's government.
Each state in the country has evolved in the manner by which judges are selected. This paper
will examine the history of those selection methods, and identifY the use of each of those methods

across the country today. In addition to an overall discussion ofthe different processes and methods
ofselecting judges, this paper will also discuss in further detail the history ofthe systems used by the
state oflllinois, a state that currently chooses to use a method ofselection, partisan election, that has
been popular countrywide since the early nineteenth century. The method chosen in Illinois has many
supporters and also much opposition. It was with controversy that Illinois has chosen to adopt this
method. It has also not been without controversy that Illinois chose to keep this method, a topic this
paper will also examine in some detail.

•
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It may also be important to look at this issue on a more personal, local level in order to try

to determine if the method chosen actually functions adequately on a tangible basis as well as in
theory. A convincing indicator ofthe success ofa system based on popular election ought to be the
participation of the local electorate in the nomination and election ofjudges in their county. To
accomplish this more in-depth appraisal, this paper will examine the method in a case study focusing
on one county in Illinois, Jackson County, in the southern part of the state, and will attempt to
identuy the viability ofthe system at the local level. In order to achieve this, this paper will identuy
some influencing fuctors at play during an election that may determine the level ofparticipation in a
judicial election. In order to identuy these influences, the study will analyze statistical data from
previous judicial elections, media materials, and a previous census. It will attempt to identifY the
functionality ofthe system in relation to the participation ofthe electorate, and determine ifa system

•

that is supposed to be one grounded in democratic theory actually is.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS AND THEIR USE

The method ofJudiciai Selection in each state is determined by the legislation ofthat state and
is detailed in the respective state Constitution. The methods most commonly ratified and used in
these constitutions have evolved over history from England and the colonies before the United States,
through the War ofIndependence and the Civil War. Today, a reform movement is taking place at
state level which continues the evolution ofthe different selection systems in place in each state, and
which caUs into question the values ofeach ofthose systems. For numerous years, each system used

•

has had critics that attest to the positive factors oftheir favored plan and the negatives ofother plans,
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a situation that continues today.
Historically, each state within the United States has employed a variety ofselection methods
(Ashman, 1). Methods that were first employed were derived from those used in England and

extended to the colonies. These systems began to change during an English Revolution in 1688
against the Stuart kings of England. The revolution led to a number offar-reaching changes in

England in the distribution of power between the monarch and other branches of government
(Ashman, 7). The Act of Settlement in 1701 permitted continuation of the previous system which

allowed the king sole power to appoint and commission judges, but placed two important checks on
the king. These checks established that the judge's term of office was to be based upon good
behavior, and that the removal ofa judge was to be only by approval and debate by members ofthe
House of Commons and the House of Lords, both of England's Houses ofParliarnent. This freed

•

judges from the belief that they merely served at the pleasure and prerogative ofthe sovereign, and
any decisions that they made that were unpopular would lead to their removal from service (Ashman,
8). Due to these checks, the judiciary in England continued to grow more independent throughout
the early eighteenth century. This was never more apparent than in 1761 when a statute was passed
that allowed for the continuation of judicial power upon the death of the appointing monarch
(Ashman, 8). Previously, when a king or queen died, the judges that were appointed by them during

their reign were replaced with judges appointed by the succeeding monarch. The new statute
provided that judges would not be replaced solely because their sponsoring monarch died. This Act
was never applicable, however, in the colonies, which was left with the old system, following the
trend in pre-revolutionary times of having different rules in the colonies from those in place in

•

England.
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Due to colonists having to live with the old, flawed system, when deciding what judicial
selection system to adopt after the War ofIndependence, eight ofthe original thirteen states in the
new United States placed the power ofappointment ofjudges in one or both houses ofthe legislature
(Ashman, 8).

The other states chose to give the power of appointment to their governors with

consent ofa conformation committee made up of state legislators.
Beginning in the mid-1800's, the appointment ofstate judges by the executive or legislature
was extremely curtailed. The era spanning from the election ofAndrew Jackson in 1829 until the end
of his tenure in office in 1837 was considered the era of "self-conscious American democracy"
(Volcansek & Lafon, 88), and was called the era ofJacksonian Democracy. Jacksonian Democracy
was motivated by general suspicion and distrust ofofficial power. The feeling ofthe people was that
government should not be used to promote narrow interests and confer special privileges. Jackson
•

constantly emphasized that the majority was meant to govern, and that political appointments were
a violation of this principle. This basic principle of Jacksonian democracy was translated into a
variety of political reform movements that argued that all state officials should be elected, even
judges, and thus accountable to the electorate. Delegates to the many individual state constitutional
conventions held in the 1840's voted in nineteen of twenty-one states for constitutions that allowed
for popular election as the process of selecting judges (Frontline). By the time of the Civil War,
support for this Jacksonian principal of less powerful government had led to more changes in favor
ofthe election system ofselecting judges. This resulted in a total oftwenty-four ofthirty-four states
utilizing popular election ofjudges at the time (Ashman, 9). Every state that joined the union from
1846 onwards ratified constitutions that provided for judicial elections (Frontline).

•

Dissatisfuction with the control afforded party "bosses" that was a consequence of the
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electoral process, led to a counter-reform movement in the late 1800's. With the formation of a
number ofassociations such as the American Bar Association, the call for the removal ofpolitics from
the judicial selection process became strong. The cry was led by bar leaders who attempted to limit
the powerful political parties' influence over the selection of judges by suggesting a variety of
reforms. These reforms included nonpartisan ballots which allowed candidates to run independently
and separate judicial nominating conventions and elections which allowed for the selection ofjudges
to be separate and distance from the election of other political officials. These methods proved
inadequate, however, to remove the effuctive control of political party leaders over elections.
Influence over selection and nomination by local and state politicians remained just as strong and
difficult to separate. Throughout the nineteenth century, most states decided to retain the electoral
system, but concern over the adverse effects grew. These adverse effects included lack of political

•

independence and decliningjudicial quality. Concerns over their effects were increasingly voiced with
the approach ofthe twentieth century. This, in turn, has led to an increase ofhybrid systems and an
expanding mix of systems being used within each state across the country during the twentieth
century (Ashman, 10).
Still today the debate over judicial election methods remains a controversial and lively one.
The culmination of the debate are these hybrid methods that have mixed and matched the methods
ofappointment and election. Support for a universal system throughout each state in the U.S. is
strong to unifY the country behind one method. Expressing strong support was a Judicial Research
Foundation Task Force comprising thirteen ofthe most knowledgeable trial court judges at the time.
They identified the problem as the diversity ofthe methods that each state uses to select judges and

•

stated that "selection of judges on a merit basis is the logical and well-proven answer. Partisan
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political election bas too frequently and for too long firiled to produce a sufficient number ofjudges
capable ofoptimumjudicial functioning. Nomination by a nonpartisan judicial selection commission
and appointment by the Governor bas proved to be the best method" (Logan, 64). Additionally, the
Task Force found that "Better selection methods will come from a unified system ofcourts" (Logan,
64). No steps have been taken as of yet to achieve this and it is probably unlikely that sweeping
changes would be adopted in each state to achieve this. Many varieties of selection methods still
remain in place nationwide.

CURRENT METIIODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

There are currently as many as five methods ofselection at the state level. Two are electoral

•

(partisan and nonpartisan elections); one is a functional equivalent offederal selection (gubernatorial
selection); another is merit selection; and the last is legislative selection. As illustrated in Table One
below, the methods utilized across the country differ greatly. They all offer advantages and
disadvantages for each state in the selection of judges who are accountable to the public, the
legislature, the governor, or who are independent. By far the most widely used system of selection
is still the election system, with the next most popular merit selection or the Missouri Plan.

•
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TABLE ONE
METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
BY STATE

Election (partisan and nonpartisan)
Merit Selection
Elected by Legislature
Appointed by Governor

•
PARTISAN AND NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS

In partisan elections, individuals run for judicial office for a fixed term under a party label.
Candidates are nominated by partisan caucuses or primaries and then run on the party label in the
November elections. Candidates may conduct a partisan campaign and be endorsed by party leaders

and other candidates running for other offices. Nonpartisan elections are those in which judicial
candidates must run without party designation and in which there are typically some restrictions as
to the kind of campaign that may be waged. Candidates are generally selected by nonpartisan
primaries and then run without party designation at a general election that is usually held in the spring

•
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(Jacob, 99). Nonpartisan elections do not necessarily mean that political parties are unimportant,
just that party labels so not appear on the ballots. In at least half of the states holding nonpartisan
elections, parties actively campaign on behalf of candidates. Some states try to isolate judicial
elections from partisanship by holding them separately from other elections. Judges are chosen by
popular election in nearly half the states (Bums et al, 153).

GUBERNATORIAL SELECTION

Gubernatorial selection with the advice and consent ofanother political body (such as state
senate, governor's council) is similar to the federal nomination system and is used only in the minority
ofstates, probably a result ofthe migration to the election and Missouri plan methods during recent
•

years due to reluctance in having judicial appointment powers focused in the hands of one person
(Goldman and Sarat, 255). This practice is used in Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, Hawaii, New
York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont (Bums et al, 152).

LEGISLATIVE SELECTION

Legislative selection is only used nominally (Goldman and Sarat). While the full legislature
is involved in the process ofselecting the person for the position, the governor is also very involved
in the process, making it very similar to gubernatorial nomination with the exception that nominations
come both from the legislature and the governor instead ofsolely from the governor. Care is taken

•

in this process not to nominate anyone that is ''personally obnoxious" to key members of the house
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and senate. Members are polled as to their feelings about the appointment of a particular judge,
following a similar system for selecting judges at the federal level (Abraham, 27). This practice is
used only in Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia (Bums et aI, 152).
In both selection by legislature and by the governor, there may also be an informal process
being set in motion in the background in which lawyers make their interest in becoming a judge
known either directly or indirectly to other lawyers, bar associations, political leaders, and interest
groups among many others, which then promote favored candidates. The names then go through the
formal nominating process (Bums et aI, 153). This allows input from interested parties, without
giving them total control of the process.

MERIT SELECTION

•

Merit selection is the method advocated byjudicial reformers (Goldman and Sarat, 256). This
method is also known as the hybrid "Missouri Plan," which combines both election and merit
selection and is named after the first state to adopt the plan in 1940 (Goldman and Sarat, 256). For
eachjudicial vacancy a nominating council or commission consisting ofmembers ofthe organized bar,
the judiciary, and the lay public, select a small group ofpeople qualified for the position, and present
their names to the governor. The governor is legally required to make the final selection from this

list ofqualified people. Some states use this as their primary method of selection, while some have
selected it as a method of filling vacancies that occur between elections. The candidate that the
governor has chosen may serve for a short term (sometimes one year) before a vote is held at the next

•

general election which asks the electorate ifthe candidate should be retained in office and serve a full
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tenn. Ifa majority of the voters agree, the judge serves a new full term. If not, another candidate
is selected using the same procedure. At the end ofhis or her term, the judge certifies a wish to have
his or her name placed on the ballot, and the voters are again asked whether they want to retain that
judge in office. Therefore, the judges run against their own records, not against another person or
party (Burns et al, 156).

ELECTION vs. MERIT SELECTION

The argument over method of selection ofjudges across the country involves the debate
between advocates ofjudicial independence versus those advocating judicial accountability (Sheldon
& Lovrich, 162). Proponents ofjudicial independence state that it is more important that the judge

•

be given the ability to be free in his decisions from considering the voter fallout ofthe decision They
believe that the system that allows for this best is that of merit selection. It allows judges to be
appointed by their peers and remain at liberty from the repercussions ofthe electorate or the political
party (in partisan elections), should they make an unpopular decision Proponents of the election
method ofselection argue that judicial accountability is more important than judicial independence.
As the governmental system ofthe United States is founded upon government by consent, electoral

selection is seen as the best method of ensuring that it remains that way. Many people see both
independence and direct accountability to the electorate as important, and see a combination ofboth
as a solution. Judicial recruitment is also often seen as something that must blend both of these
conflicting requirements (Sheldon & Lovrich, 168).

•

An additional problem that exists does not aid in the debate of which system is the best
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method ofselection ofjudges across the country. This obstacle is that theorists and social scientists
on both sides ofthe argument have been unable to quantitatively demonstrate that the type ofmethod
used in selecting a judge actually makes a difference to the type ofperson who ends up serving at the
bench (Sheldon & Lovrich, 170). Much research has focused on this subject, as many as twenty
eight studies from 1965 to 1982 (Volcansek, 81). In a comprehensive review ofselection research,
Gene Flango and Craig Ducat concluded that "Despite extensive research, no one has been able to
show that different selection procedures produce differences in the characteristics of judges[,]
decisions or courts" (F1ango & Ducat, 39). Research continues into the characteristics and
performances ofjudges who are selected using the different methods, and comparisons and contrasts
ofeach method will continue in the future as it has in the past, but as individualjudges are all different
from each other experience, character, and morally, the limitations of the research will continue.

•

ILLINOIS

Illinois has chosen the partisan election system. Judges in Illinois are nominated by their party
and compete in general elections, usual1y in November. Each judge, in keeping with the general
system ofelectingjudges, then later files his interest in retention which is consequently voted on again
with a general election. The judge must receive a positive vote from three-fifths or more of those

voters expressing an opinion in order to remain in office. The Constitution ofIllinois allows for this
process in Article VI - The Judiciary, Section 12, Election and Retention. The Constitution states
"Supreme, Appellate and Circuitjudges shall be nominated at primary elections or by petition. Judges

•

shall be elected at general orjudicial elections as the General Assembly shall provide by law" (White,
-11
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117). The requirement of three-fifths or more ofthe electorate who expressed an opinion doing so
in the positive was changed from one-half or more in the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Kenney &
Brown, 131). This was due to the filet that no judge had ever been denied retention and the
requirement seemed too lenient. The present vote of three-fifths has not led to any judges being
denied retention outside ofa large investigation into corruptjudges in the Chicago area in 1990 when
ten were dismissed. (Kenney & Brown, 131).

mSTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS AND THEIR USE IN ILLINOIS

In Illinois, the question ofthe type ofmethod to use for selecting judges is as strongly debated

as elsewhere in the country. The electoral system that is used is criticized by opponents as too reliant
•

on party politics. These opponents advocate merit selection as a way to keep branches of the
government separate. The conflict was never more apparent than in a compromise between
proponents ofthe election process and proponents ofmerit selection in 1962 which allowed for initial
partisan elections, but allowed the electorate to vote on whether to retain the judge as opposed to
making the judge run against an opponent for retention (Kenney & Brown, 132). This compromise

was the result of many months ofdebate between two opposite factions.
As with many prior constitutional conventions throughout American history, judicial selection

became a major issue ofthe 1969-70 Illinois constitutional convention. Two sides hotly debated the
issue for many months. Both sides had motives that were influenced by principle and by what
position would best serve their interests (Kenney & Brown, 132). It was not resolved until almost

•

the fina1 day ofdebate (Kenney & Brown, 132). The two sides ofthe argument focused on whether
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the state should retain elections for judicial selection, or change to the merit selection system. Those
arguing for election stated that it was essential for an open, democratic society (Kenney & Brown,
132). Those favoring merit selection stated that it would bring more professionalism and better
judges to the judiciary. A resolution at the constitutional convention was not achieved, and the
argument continued. It was finally settled with a referendum for voters to select the method that they
preferred. In the referendum, the results were 50.2 percent voting for election selection, and 43
percent votes for merit selection (Kenney & Brown, 133). As the results were so close, the
compromise was made between the two systems. The results mirrored the split between the two
sides with the suburban Cook County favoring merit selection and ruraI counties favoring the election
system (Kenney & Brown, 132).
The argument in Illinois continues today as within each state in the rest ofthe country. The

•

American Judicature Society, a nonpartisan organization with a national membership of judges,
lawyers, and non-legally trained citizens interested in the administration ofjustice, sponsors an Illinois
Committee on Judicial Independence (American Judicature Society) which publishes current efforts
to revise the system. Current supporters ofmerit selection routinely debate and initiate discourse on
the subject, including proposals for constitutional amendments. A Governor's Task Force on Judicial
Merit Selection to propose a constitutional amendment was appointed by Governor Thompson in
1987 (Kenney & Brown, 137). The Task Force found that merit selection should be implemented
with appointed screening panel reviews after the judge has served for ten years. The plan again
broul!ht much debate and was eventuallv defeated in the Senate Executive Committee hv a vote of
__

'"

.

01

twelve to six (Kenney & Brown, 137). The subject remains an issue in the state oflllinois.

•
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ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

As discussed above, Illinois has chosen the election method, but not without controversy.

However, as this is the system currently in place, a deeper examination of the election method is
needed in order to understand it more comprehensively. Because judicial selection methods are so
controversial, it makes sense that many arguments extended by supporters as to the advantages and
disadvantages ofeach system can be countered by logical reasoning. This is certainly the case with
the election system. Proponents ofthe election method feel that election can achieve elimination of

an elite group selecting judges. Thus the choices would be more representative ofthe people. They
also feel that judges should be accountable to the people, like other elected officials, and that this

would be accomplished by the election ofjudges just as in election of other public officials. Yet
•

elections held to select other officials cannot be compared to those held to select judges. Under the
Judicial Canons that govern election behavior for candidates ofthe judiciary, candidates are not free
to speak about issues that may come before them, as they are forbidden to make prejudgements on
these issues. They can only promote themselves as fair and honest. The campaigns ofother elected
officials are not bound by these regulations, thus they cannot really be compared. The Canons were
initiated to provide for an impartial judiciary that cannot afford to make prejudgements on public
issues. Judges "perform purely technical and narrow legal tasks . .. [thus] their (the public)
participation in the process ofstaffing the courts is wholly unnecessary" (Dubois, 23).
Another asserted advantage of support for the election process states the need to remove
elitist influence from the process. This may be undermined with the argument that most judges

•

initially come to the bench by appointment, even when election is the primary method of selection
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(Dubois, 109). Ifa sitting judge resigns in midterm, the governor is given the power to appoint a
judge to fill the position. Furthermore, when a candidate has the benefit ofrunning as an incumbent,
sIhe is more likely to be the winner of the judicial race in the next election - ifhe chooses to seek

another term. Thus, the governor's influence enters into the selection process designed to eliminate
elitist control.
The nomination of the candidates for open judicial seats is again another decision denied the
public in the election method ofselecting judges. Although interested candidates may campaign and
received nomination without party support, party leaders genera1Jy get together to decide whom they
will support and offer their select few to the public as affi1iates to vote on during the primary

elections. This tends to place 1imitations on the choice that the electorate has in the selection ofthe
candidates that they have to vote for as they lack awareness ofeverybody running for election. This

•

also takes the process out ofthe hands ofthose who know the candidates and their qua1ifications and
puts it into the hands ofparty leaders whose loyalty remains party affi1iation, not the general public.
Again, without party support, an otherwise suitable candidate may be overshadowed in the election
process while party supported candidates are given more recognition due to their affi1iation.
Proponents ofthe election method indicate that through retention elections, the sittingjudges
are checked by the public, thus this method prevails over the merit selection in their eyes. By
accountability, it is meant that if the electorate is not pleased with the performance of the judge, it
has the power to remove him from office. Considered in this argument is that although voter turnout
is higher for partisan elections as compared to nonpartisan elections, overall voter turnout for judicial
primary and general elections is low compared to other political races. Voters are often not aware

•

ofwhom or what they are voting for because they do not receive cues concerning how the candidates
-15
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stand on certain issues. Consequently, rather than make an irrational choice, most voters choose not
to vote at all. There is a body of literature to suggest that low information leads to low turnout If
they do vote, they rely on such factors as party affiliation or a popular name, lacking enough
information on the personal characteristics, experience or ideology of the nominated judge to fill a
seat in the court. The average citizen does not make it a point to check the record ofa sitting judge.

In addition to this, a study on judicial selection found that 'judicial elections do not serve as feedback

devices for the judiciary" (Jacob, 1966), not providing the check as claimed.

VOTER PARTICIPATION IN ILLINOIS/JACKSON COUNTY

Traditionally, voter turnout in Illinois is high (Kenney & Brown, 33). The percentage of

•

people in Illinois who participate in elections is above the national average of50.1 percent in 1988
at a total of 53 percent (Kenney & Brown, 33). This is slowly declining each year as voters
participate less in each election, and certainly participate less in lower level, less important local races.
As judicial races are not as important to the majority ofthe electorate as that ofpresident or governor

oftheir state, participation injudicial elections locally could be expected to be low. In the 1990 U.S.
Census, the total population ofpeople reported to be living in Jackson County aged 18 or over, and
therefore considered to eligible to vote, totals 49, 467 out of a total population of 61 ,067 (U.S.
Census, 1990). In the judicial elections held in Jackson County in 1988, turnout totaled 20,400, or
41 percent ofthose eligible. As this turnout is below statewide norms for elections, unusual factors
must exist which influence whether the potential electorate participates or not. In order to study

•

whether these factors do detennine electoral participation, they must first be identified.
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INFLUENCING FACTORS ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Voter participation is reliant on many fuctors, both external and internal. External factors
detennine whether potential voters will participate in a specific election. They may be descnbed as
outside influences that help detennine the level ofvoter participation. These factors can range from
knowledge ofthe candidates, publicity ofthe electoral race, and whether the race is partisan or not.
Lack ofinformation about an election often leads to lack ofinterest in participating in that election.
Internal factors also detennine whether a potential voter will participate in any electoral race. They
tend to be more personal to the electorate and drive the likelihood of participation from inside the
voter. These factors include the voter's sociological identity, some not subject to change, such as
age, race, and gender, and others that are such as education and income level.
•

The primary argument of used to justify elections as the best method of selecting judges in
Illinois is that the public should be allowed to select their judges, and that the system is grounded in
a democratic principle. Therefore, examination ofthe electoral turnout is required to examine ifvoter
participation is high enough to justify the arguments in support of the method.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS

The distinction of external methods versus internal methods is that they are controlled by
outside influences that the voter cannot control. There are several external factors that have been
found to influence the results ofpartisanjudicial elections in Jackson County in any given year. These

•

factors include election scheduling, bar association ratings, media coverage, party affiliation, and
-17
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incumbency. Althoughjudges do not face an adversary after being elected to the bench, they do face
a retention election, which can also be influenced by some of the above-mentioned fuctors. Below
is an outline of current nonns concerning each of the factors that have an external impact on the
results of partisan and retention elections.
The first external factor that should be considered is the scheduling ofelections. This refers
to the year in which any given race for judicial office is held. In any election year, several races for
office are held during the same election. Some races have a higher profile than others. These include
presidential elections and gubernatorial elections.

During presidential election years, voter

participation is usually higher, a consequence ofmore publicity surrounding presidential campaigns.
Other high profile campaigns include elections for governor and state senate. Surprisingly, however,
even these races are sometimes not enough to persuade the electorate to vote on the day. Studies
•

confirm that even in the case where governor and senate races would be considered high salience
races, voter turnout decreases in non-presidential election years (Milbrath, 35). So, when comparing
judicial election voter turnout, a comparison must be made between the percentage ofturnout for the
race that would be considered the most prominent for that particular election. This is to say that in
presidential election years, the most prominent race would be the presidential race, and in non
presidential years, it would be the race for the office ofGovemor or Senator, and so on, whichever
is applicable.
The next external factor that should be studied is bar association ratings on each judicial
candidate. In spite ofCanon Seven, the public does have a few other sources to look for information
on judicial candidates. One is the bar association rating ofjudicial candidates which is supported in

•

Canon Eight which focuses on ethical considerations, (EC 8-6). "Generally, lawyers are qualified,
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by personal observation and investigation, to evaluate the qualifications ofpersons seeking or being

considered for such public offices, and for this reason they have a special responsibility to aid in the
selection of those who are qualified" (American Bar Association, 45).
In Illinois, the state bar association poDs lawyers, the peers ofprospective judicial candidates,
and sitting judges. The questionnaire focuses on the candidate's temperament, integrity, and other
personal qualities that the bar association feels would characterize a good judge. After the
questionnaires are returned, the association hands down a rating spanning from "Strongly
Recommended" to "Strongly Not Recommended" based upon the information gathered. Analysis
has shown that although voters may use this information as a cue in selectingjudges, bar poDs remain

in question because the results ofsuch polls are not always highly publicized and further, that lawyers
who are polled are usually giving general answers because they often remain as uninformed as the

•

average voter (Dubois, 67). Research also suggests that lawyers favor incumbent judges, possibly
because they fuel that prior experience is an important qualification or that they face a personal stake
in the matter should negative responses concerning a sitting judge become known (Watson &
Downing, 223). The results of a study conducted in 1987 by the Illinois Judicial Council Special
Committee on the Selection ofJudges found that although the bar association plays a significant role
in judicial selection in Illinois, there are many cases that show abuse in the rating process, where the
buddy system leads to poor ratings ofopponents ofcolleagues and friends. (Hall, 19). Additionally,
the system is often considered a way for the bar association to become involved in the election
process. The bar association considers the merit selection method preferable to the election method
as merit selection allows greater control over the process by the bar association and it's members

•

(Jacob, 57). Consequently in 1998, the President of the American Bar Association sent a message
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to the bar membership condoning and reinforcing the need for judicial independence (American Bar
Association Journal). Additionally in 1999, the American Bar Association again publically affirmed
its commitment to merit selection in a report resulting from an Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial
Campaign Finance, Standing Committee on Ethics (American Bar Association).
The third influencing external factor, media coverage, is associated in with the ratings ofbar
associations. The media is responsible for bringing the results ofthese poDs to the public. "If voters
are provided with information onjudicial candidates ... they use it," indicates a study reported in the
Social Science Quarterly (Johnson et al). Newspapers may even rate the candidates to give the

public a more informed choice. Again, the problem here could be lack ofinformation on candidates.
Although news reporters may be more apt to conduct a background study of how a sitting judge
performs, they have no real basis for recommending a lawyer who has never served on the bench.

•

Judicial elections are also unique as compared to other partisan elections because the
candidates are restricted by the "Code ofJudicial Ethics." This limits the amount ofmedia coverage
that they will or may receive. Formally referred to as the "Canons ofJudicial Ethics" (Canons). As
outlined in Canon Seven (B) (I) (c) concerning political campaign conduct:
"A candidate, including an incumbent judge ... should not make pledges or promises ofconduct in
office other than the fuithful and impartial performance ofthe duties ofthe office; announce his views
on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or
other filet" (American Bar Association, 69).
Because of these restrictions, the public can gain little information in the media concerning
judicial candidates. This may hinder the ability of the public to make an informed choice, as was

•

concluded from an exit poll in Texas which showed that voters were generally unaware ofdifferences
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between the candidates on the ballot form (McKnight, 99). Such research suggests that people tend
not to vote for judicial candidates, although they cast their votes for candidates in other races.
Evidence of this can be seen when comparing voter turnout figures for a given election. Usually,
there is a drop-off rate of persons who vote in the more visible contest as compared to those who
vote in judicial elections, especially retention elections. In a study on degree of public awareness of
judicial candidates and elections, it was found that 'Judicial elections are low-salience contests"
(Ladinsky & Silver) which means that they are not high-profile enough to be important to the
electorate.
These unintentional restrictions appear to be stem from the beliefthat the judiciary is part of
the government and must remain impartial and removed from public opinion. In developing these
Canons, supporters feel that the judiciary protects its image ofdignity and independence. (Crane,

•

125). Opponents feel that this is a 'Judicial myth" in the sense that the judiciary cannot remain
impartial or removed from the selection process whether it is election or merit selection. According
to Stephen Daniels and Frank 1. Kopecky, "courts, as other governmental institutions, are political
institutions, and judges, as other political officials, are political actors" (Crane, 125).
The next external factor that should be considered is party affiliation. A partisan election
requires judicial candidates to run under a party label (usual1y Democrat or Republican). Therefore
examination should be undertaken to determine whether voters use party as a cue when voting in
judicial elections, much like they do in other partisan elections. In a study of the relationship of
voting behavior and party affiliation, Phillip DuBois finds that "on the average, voters in the partisan
states are more likely to cast their votes along party lines than voters in the mixed and nonpartisan

•

states" (DuBois, 74).
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The final influencing external fuctor relates to candidate incumbency. When a sitting judge
vacates his or her seat in midterm, the governor appoints a replacement to serve until the term
expires. Evidence indicates that the incumbent has the advantage of experience when running for
election. Voters often identifY with his or her name and feel that a candidate with a proven record
of performance will be the best choice. Though this fuctor has been noted to be more influential in
nonpartisan elections which lack party as a cue for voting, "the incumbent judge... may puU voters
away from their usual partisan preferences" (DuBois, 88).
There are, therefore, five factors that may tend to influence judicial selection and voter
participation in the election method ofselection. These include election scheduling, bar association
ratings, media coverage, party affiliation, and incumbency. These factors may be studied to perhaps
determine the likelihood ofvoter participation in any judicial election, and ifthat participation is high

•

enough to defend the use ofthe election method ofjudicial selection chosen in Illinois.

INTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS

In addition to external factors influencing judicial selection and voter participation, there are
also several internal fuctors that influence the electorate's decision both whether to vote in an
electoral race and also the vote direction that they cast. These factors mainly consist ofdemographic,
social and economic fuctors such as age, gender, race, educational level, and social class.
The age ofthe electorate is a significant factor in determining whether someone will vote or
not. In 1972, suffrage was granted to 18 to 21 year olds, increasing the number ofeligible voters in

•

the country. However, this population has

8

large proportion of people who pass up their first
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opportunity to vote as voter turnout steadily declines each year (Flanigan & Zingale, 40). The
likelihood ofvoting increase with age, as by the age ofthirty-five, most people have voted on at least
one occasion. A small portion of middle-aged to older group potential voters remain never having
voted (Flanigan & Zingale, 41). Among all age groups, with 50 percent the 18 - 25 age range has
the smallest group ofpeople responding affirmatively to a Center for Political Studies 1996 National
Election Study poll questioning whether they have ever voted (Flanigan & Zingale, 41) This
gradually increases and levels offat age 46 and up with 80 percent ofrespondents answering that they
had participated (Flanigan & Zingale, 41). Increased participation with age is likely due to the fact

that older voters are more settled in their lives, are already registered, and have more time to
experience voting as an expected activity (Schmidt et al, 341). In the 1992 election, 38.5 percent
ofthose aged 18 to 20 turned out to vote and 70.1 percent ofeligible people aged 65 and over turned
•

out to vote. (See Table Two, Page 22).

TABLE TWO

VOTING IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION BY AGE GROUP (IN PERCENTAGE)

REPORTED TURNOUT
(%)

AGE

38.5
45.7
53.2
63.6

18-20
21-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
65 and over

•

..nn
IV.v

70.1

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
overnment Printing Office, 1994). Data are for 1992.
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Educational level is also significant in detennining whether an eligible person will ever vote.
The higher the education level of a person, the higher the possibility ofparticipation in the electoral
system. Pursuit ofan education away from home by younger people, however, is determined to stop
people from voting as failure to meet resident requirement. In addition to this hurdles of initial
registration create barriers and desire to vote in short-term local level elections also deter students
from voting. Therefore, in general, the more education a person has, the more likely they are to vote,
with the exception of those in the process of gaining an education. Reported turnout in the 1992
presidential election was 30 percentage points higher for those with a college education than it was
for those who had never been to high school (Schmidt et al, 341). One activist for low income
workers states in the book Politics and the Class Divide that "I would say to a very large degree the

•

better the education, the much greater chance that, not only are they aware already of what the
problems are, but they're also more perceptive and responsive to solutions (Crouteau, 155). These
references are almost always targeted toward the college educated. Many believe that high schools
and grade schools teach only compliance and complacency and not creativity and other thinking
schools. This suggests that those with a high school education will be less likely to vote (See Table
Three), but that if they do, they may be more inclined to vote for an incumbent politician following
the system that is already in place instead oflooking toward creating a new one.

•
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TABLE THREE
VOTING IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
BY EDUCATION LEVEL (IN PERCENTAGE)

REPORTED TURNOUT

YEARS OF SCHOOL
COMPLETED

Source:

(%)

8 years or less

35.1

9-11 years

42.2

12 years

57.5

1-3 years of college

68.7

4 + years of college

81.0

U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S
Government Printing Office, 1994). Data are for 1992.

•
Social class and related income is a third type ofinternal factor that may impact the likelihood
ofa person to vote. Differences exist in the economic and social interests ofsocial classes, and these
interests will determine whether a person will vote or not. The middle to high social classes are more
likely to vote as they are usually more connected to community groups and organizations leading to
familiarity and knowledge of the people involved in the process, which in turn leads to greater
turnout. So, the greater the income, the more likely a person is to join a voluntary association
(Crouteau, 49). Social class is ofcourse linked to income levels. Wealthier people tend to be over
represented in the electorate. In the 1992 presidential election, income levels ofpeople who voted

•
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in the election ranged from 40 percent ofthose eligible in the $15,000 and under income level group
to 70 percent of those eligible in the $50,000 and over income level group (Schmidt et ai, 341).
Additionally, those people with low incomes and working class status are more likely to become
disillusioned with a system that has not been particularly beneficial to them. The most common
critique of workers toward politicians is that today's officials seem more out of touch with regular
people (Crouteau, 57). Worker's believe that the government used to be more responsive than it
currently is, and participation is seen as not making a difference in lack ofresponse (Crouteau, 57).
In addition, wealthy politicians are seen by the working class as promoting the interests of other
wealthy citizens at the expense ofworkers (Crouteau, 57). Wealth, then, serves to isolate politicians
from regular citizens, leading to disinterest in a system that does not serve the working class, leading
in turn to lack of desire to participate.

•

Race is another factor in determining voting participation. Typically, and due to historical
conditions, a white person is more likely to vote than a minority person. In the 1992 presidential
election, whites participated at 59 percent ofthose who were eligible to 51.5 percent of blacks who
were eligible (Schmidt et al, 341). Equal access to the ballot box and equal opportunity to
participate in politics in other ways did not effectively exist for minorities until the mid 1960s
(Conway, 24).

Election procedures in place before this time tended to discourage minority

participation by allowing local election officials to establish irregular hours for voting and to provide
inadequate procedures for absentee voting in areas that were traditionally concentrated with a
population of :r.morities (Conway, 24). With c!'.l!!lges in these IRws, pa.rticipation for blacks

ha~

increased steadily, but when comparing blacks and whites ofthe same other internal factors such as

•

class, education etc., blacks are still somewhat less likely to vote than whites (Conway, 24).
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Additionally, blacks and other minorities are greatly under represented in government, causing a lack
of identification with the government by blacks.
Gender is the fifth determinate of voting participation. Historically, women were denied the
vote until granted suffrage under the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. Until recently, women have
been less likely to vote than men, when taking into consideration their greater population numbers in
the United States. In the book American Voter, the author describes this phenomenon as resulting
from the deeper ingrained roles ofthe female gender in the American culture that for many years made
the man the person in the family to make the political decisions (Campbell et al, 484). Campbell et
al. also found in their 1960 political participation interviews that many women referred him to their
hushands to give the interview, still feeling uncomfortable about having an opinion about the topic and
feeling that "politics is for men" (Campbell et al, 485). As women now vote more than men, the

•

absolute size oftheir vote has increased to be larger than that ofvotes by men, not the average two
thirds that is has previously been the norm (Campbell et al, 484). Although this research discusses

life and opinions in the I 960s in reference to political participation, and today women now vote more
than men, America has still to elect some women president or vice-president. As with race, the

characteristics ofthe federal level government still badly under represents the group when compared
to the national population. The characteristics of the 105th Congress (1997 to 1999) reflect this:
women comprised II percent of the House and 9 percent of the Senate. This compares to the 51
percent population ofwomen nationwide as reported in the U.S. Census of1990 (Schmidt et al, 399).
(See Table Four).
When combined together, the demographic, social and economic factors described above

•

represent a group of internal fuctors that affect whether a population participates in the political
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process. These characteristics are either invariable (age, race and gender) or variable (education,
income). Demographic factors that cannot be changed combine with factors that may be to shape the
likelihood ofvoter turnout. The socioeconomic factors ofeducation and income have been shown to
significantly determine participation. The higher a person's socioeconomic status, the more likely is
he or she to vote (Olsen, lSI). Research conducted in the book Why Americans Don't Vote identifies
three effects that socioeconomic status has on voter turnout: a) the higher the level of educational
attainment, the more likely a person is to vote; (b) the less manual the occupation, the more likely a
person is to vote; and (c) the higher the level ofincome, the more likely a person is to vote (Teixeira,
21). In addition to this, demographic factors such as age, race, and gender impact for participation
but that impact changes across socioeconomic status. Thus, a young, black woman is more likely to
vote ifshe is college educated and has a high income than is she were less educated and lower in social

•

status.

Just as variable and invariable factors influence whether a person will participate in the political
process, so too does the factor ofwhether the potential voter feels that his or her group is represented
in the govermnent or office pertaining to the election. The American system is a representative
democracy where choices are made by a small group that effect the larger group (Flanigan & Zingale).
The less the potential voter feels that he or she is or has been represented in the past or will be in the
future, the less likely he or she is to vote. The groups that are less likely to participate in the political
process include people who are black, female, low income, less educated or young. When examining
these fuets silnultaneously with the characteristics of the federal government, groups who are less
likely to vote surely feel under represented. The average federal elected official is a white, college

•

educated male with a high income who is around fifty. The characteristics ofthe I OSth Congress (1997
-28

•

to 1999) show that women account for only 9 to 11 percent ofpoliticians (Schmidt et a1, 399). It is

also true that 93 to 94 percent ofpoliticians in Congress have college degrees (Schmidt et a1, 399).
There were also no blue-collar workers in Congress (Schmidt et al, 199). (See Table Four).

TABLE FOUR
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 105'" CONGRESS
(1997 TO 1999)
CHARACTERISTIC

•

U.S. POPULAnON

HOUSE

SENATE

Age (median)

33.0

50.9

57.4

Percentage minority

28.0

13.5

4.0

Percentage Female

51.9

11.0

9.0

Percentage with college degrees

21.4

93.0

94.0

Occupation
Percentage lawyers
Percentage blue collar workers

2.8
20.1

39.0
0.0

54.0
0.0

Family Income
Percentage of families earning
over $50,000 annually

22.0

100.0

100.0

Personal wealth
Percentage of population with
assets over $1 million

0.7

16.0

33.0

Source: Schmidt et al.

•

Research has demonstrated then, that external influencing factors ofelection scheduling, media
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coverage, bar association rating, party affiliation, and incumbency and internal influencing filctors of
age, race, gender, economic status and educational level impact the participation of the electorate in
elections. To examine the impact of these factors on judicial elections, this case study focuses on
judicial elections in Jackson County, Illinois. This study identifies a hypothesis to identitY possible
influencing filctors and the result of participation from each. It then examines available data in
connection with those hypotheses in determining whether each hypothesis may be confinned.

STUDY OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS IN JACKSON COUNTY

In order to determine which external factors influence voters in Jackson County in Southern

Illinois, voter records were examined from 1976 to 1988. These records were selected in order to

•

utilize information for both externa1 and internal factors. As the last official census was collected in
1990, information from voting records from 1988 contained the data needed to aUow examination of
both factors, and was thus the last data to be collected. Although the focus ofthis study is the judicial
election, it was necessary to collect data on voting behavior for other races such as presidential
candidates, gubernatorial candidates, and senatorial candidates. While the 1988 election was the
primary focus, data was also collected for previous elections to determine if patterns existed
concerning Jackson County's voting behaviorinjudicial elections. During the period of1976 to 1988,
there were elevenjudicial partisan elections and twenty-five retention elections; many occurring in the
same election year. Several hypotheses can be inferred from the data gathered.

•
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HYPOTIlESIS ONE

Judicial election voter turnout figures will show a marked increase during presidential election
years as compared to non-presidential election years.

METIIODS AND ANALYSIS

Data comparing the mean voter turnout for judicial retention elections indicates that voter
turnout is higher in presidential election years than for non-presidential years. The data shows that
in the 1986 race for Governor, the actual voter turnout was 15,688. The mean voter turnout for
judicial elections in the same year (see Appendix A) was 11,195.

•

These numbers increase to 21,185 and 15,318 respectively in 1988 when the race includes a
presidential contest. Similar patterns can be determined when comparing high and low salience races
from 1976 through 1988.

•
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TABLE FIVE
VOTER TURNOUT FOR HIGH SALIENCE RACES
AS COMPARED TO THE MEAN VOTER
TURNOUT FOR JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS
JACKSON COUNTY. ILLINOIS

YEAR

•

HIGH SALIENCE
RACE"

ACTUAL
VOTER
TURNOUT

MEAN VOTER
TURNOUT IN
RETENTION
ELECTIONS

DIFFERENCE IN VOTE
TURNOUT FOR HIGH
SALIENCE RACES AS
COMPARED TO
RETENTION ELECTION

1976

President

24,132

15,594

8,538

1978

State Rep.

14,573

8,884

5,689

1980

President

23,829

15,139

8,680

1982

Governor

17,928

12,247

5,681

1984

President

25,896

16,674

9,222

1986

Governor

15,688

I 1,195

4.493

1988

President

21,185

15,318

5,867

• Determined by race in which the most votes were cast.

Because there were no judicial partisan elections in the non-presidential election years under
examination, no conclusions could be formed about those elections. However, when comparing the
mean voter turnout for judicial partisan elections to retention elections (see Table Five, page 31), the
number ofparticipants in the partisan races highly exceeds that of the retention elections. This could
meal). th.at more campaign activity between candidates in partisan election produces more interest a.'1d
information about the election, both positive influencing fuctors relating to voter turnout.

•
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TABLE SIX
COMPARING VOTER TURNOUT
FOR PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
AND RETENTION ELECTIONS
(BASED ON MEAN VOTER TURNOUT

YEAR*

VOTER TURNOUT FOR
PARTISAN ELECTION

VOTER TURNOUT FOR
RETENTION ELECTION

NUMERICAL
DIFFERENCE

1976

22,552

15,594

6,958

1980

21,190

15,139

6,051

1988

19,622

15,318

4,304

*Included are those years in which partisan elections and retention elections occurred simultaneously.

•
When comparing actual voter turnout in high salience races to the mean voter turnout for the
retention elections, an interesting note here is that during non-presidential years, the gap between those
who vote in the high salience race and judicial race narrows. (See Table Seven, page 33). This may
indicate that the voters who do participate in non-presidential elections are more apt to complete their
ballots, or that as they are the most motivated and informed voters they have the knowledge about the
race that enables them to make choices even in low salience, low information elections.

•
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TABLE SEVEN
VOTER TURNOUT FOR HIGH SALIENCE (PRESIDENTIAL) RACES
AS COMPARED TO THE MEAN VOTER
TURNOUT FOR PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS

YEAR

ACTUAL
VOTER
TURNOUT

1976

24,132

22,552

Democrat

1,577

1980

23,829

21,190

Democrat
Democrat
Republican

2,639

1988

21,185

19,622

Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican

1,563

MEAN VOTER
TIJRNOUTIN
PARTISAN
ELECTIONS

JUDICIAL ELECTION
PARTY AFFILIATION
OF FAVORED CANDIDATE

•

NUMERICAL
DIFFERENCE

Further evidence ofdifferences in voter turnout can be found by comparing data in Table Seven
and Table Five (pages 33 and 31). The gap between voter turnout for the high salience race and
judicial partisan elections is not as wide as that of the high salience race and retention elections,
possibly an indication of voter fatigue, Voter fatigue likely develops because the judicial retention
question is placed by statute on the seventh or eighth page near the end ofthe ballot (See Appendix
C). Voters who tend to vote only in presidential elections are not as interested in other sections on

the ballot and tend to disregard some questions toward the end. Thus, it appears that voters brought
out to vote by the presidential election may prefer to cast votes in all the contested races at the

•

beginning ofthe ballot whereas the more dedicated voter tends to complete the whole ballot.
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HYPOTHESIS TWO

Judicial candidates will not be elected or retained ifthey receive an unfavorable rating from the
Illinois State Bar Association.

METIIODS AND ANALYSIS

This hypothesis should be tested across two groups, candidates who are running for office and
those who are seeking retention. In the data collected and studied, there were eleven separate partisan
elections from 1976 through 1988 and seven retention elections in the same period.
Of the eleven separate elections, only four candidates were rated "Strongly Not
•

Recommended" by the Illinois State Bar Association. The remaining candidates received fuvorable
ratings, with the exception being the Republican candidate, Welch, who in 1980 was not given a rating
because the Bar was not notified of his candidacy soon enough to issue a rating. Three of the four
candidates that received an unfavorable rating lost his or her bid for a seat on the bench. Lowery
(1988) the fourth candidate, defeated his recommended opponent by a mere 0.7 percent (152 out of
19002) of the vote, which appears to suggest that Lowery's reputation with the local electorate
outweighed the ratings of the bar association.
Judges who are seeking retention must have fewer than 70 points out of 100 oftotaled scores

:from coID-pleted questiO!LnRires. Ollly Judge South W:I!': rate as UStrongly Not R_ecoITunended" durLng
this period, but as data shows, he was retained in office. As noted in Table Three on Judicial

•

Retention Elections, Judge Richman barely received a recommendation by the Illinois State Bar
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TABLE EIGHT
PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTION RESULTS
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
CANDIDATE

NUMBER OF
VOTES

(0) Green.l
(R) Ridgeway

13,788
8,764

22,552

11,168
10,756

21,924

11,460
9,550

21,010

10,243
10,394

20,637

6,460
13,940

20,400

(0) Watt .I (I)
(R) Isaacs J(

14,526
5,779

20,305

Supreme
Court

(0) Calvo
(R) Welch .I

10,423
9,339

19,762

Appellate
Court

(0) Howerton .I
(R) Evers

13,003
6,733

19,736

(0) Chapman
(R) Keenan

10,849
8,385

19,234

(0) Goldenhersch
(R) Long

10,059
8,854

18,913

9,425
9,577

19,002

YEAR"

(0) Hood.l
(R) South

1980

(I)

(0) Howerton .I
(R) Powless

•

Appellate
Court

(0) Mays J(
(R) Welch

1988

(0) Beedle
(R) Gilbert .I

(I)

*
J(

(I)

(0) Rarick
(R) Lowery J(

.I
J(

*

(0)
(I)

•

TOTAL VOTER
TURNOUT

Recommended by the SoU/hem Illinoisan
Strongly Not Recommended by the Illinois State Bar Association
Write-in Candidate; lIui raied by Illinois Staie Bar Association
Democrat party affiliation
(R)
Republican party affiliation
Incumbent

Included are those years when races were held for partisan judicial elections. Appellate and Supreme Court
candidates have previous judicial experience, except for Long (1988).
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Association. Categories such as judicial temperament, judicial integrity, etc. are weighed differently
in importance, therefore a candidate can score below average in one or more, without bringing down
the total score below the 70 points needed for recommendation. Thus, based upon the information
here, judges who seek election are affected by their bar association ratings, whereas judges seeking
retention are not.

It should be remembered, however, that in retention elections, judges are rarely removed from
the bench. By looking at the actual voter turnout figures (Table Five, page 31) for these particular
elections as compared to other retention elections of 1986, a vast difference can be seen when
comparing the numbers of affirmative votes and negative votes. In the remaining four elections, the
affirmative votes exceed 7,000 votes while the votes in this same category for Richman and South are

•

below 7,000. Looking at the negative votes ("no"), the turnout figures are higher for Richman and
South as compared to the other four judges. This information indicates two findings. First, when
subtracting the negative votes from the affirmative votes, the difference is smaller for Richman and
South, thus they were retained by a slimmer margin. Secondly, upon adding the total votes cast in
each ofthese elections, the results show a higher turnout rate for the Richman and South elections.
It may be inferred from this that because of the publicized negative ratings by the Illinois State Bar
Association people had information on which to base their decision, thus the turnout was greater in
these two instances. Additionally, it appears that voters carne out not necessarily to cast their votes
for these candidates, but rather to vote against them.

•
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HYPOTHESIS THREE

Media coverage will have a positive effect on voter turnout in judicial partisan and retention
elections.

METIIODS AND ANALYSIS

Comparing data in much the same way as that in the category of the influence of the Illinois
State Bar Association, the effect that a positive recommendation by the Southern Illinoisan area
newspaper had on voter turnout was examined. (See Table Eight, page 36). For each judicial partisan
race (except in the case ofMays v. Welch, 1980), one candidate was recommended over the other by

•

the Southern Illinoisan in its Editorial section. Based upon the data, voter turnout was not influenced
by the Southern Illinoisan as it remained significantly unchanged during 1980 when the newspaper did
not express a preference. The results suggest that the newspapers endorsement may have, however,
affected the success ofthe candidates. Based upon election results from these races, 70 percent ofthe
fuvored candidates won their elections. Because none ofthe judicial retention candidates were termed
"not recommended" by the Southern Illinoisan, there was no data to prove or disprove these
hypotheses for retention elections.

HYPOTHESIS FOUR

Party affiliation will be a cue to voters in judicial partisan elections, much like it is for other

•
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partisan elections.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

When reviewing data represented in Table Eight (page 36), it appears that voters in Jackson
County fuvor Democratic judicial candidates. In two of the three races where the Republican
candidate was victorious, the results show very close races. First, the Mays v. Welch race (1980) was
characterized by a "Strongly Not Recommended" bar association rating for Mays and no rating from
the bar for the write-in candidate Welch. The public most probably was torn between its allegiance
to the Democratic candidate and the negative rating of this candidate. Additionally, Welch, a
republican, was endorsed by the Southern Illinoisan, yet was still defeated by the democratic candidate

•

Mays. Turning to the Rarick v. Lowery race (1988), here again was the struggle of whether or not
to choose the "faithful party" candidate. In this election, Lowery was well known in the area and his
opponent was from Troy, Illinois, leading to a conflict between familiarity and party loyalty. This
struggle combined with the conflicting ratings from the State Bar Association made for a tight race
that was tipped in Lowery's fuvor. The exception to this is the judicial race ofBeedle v. Gilbert. This
race defied the correlations made here concerningjudicial elections and party affiliation. This race was
extremely different and is descnbed later.
The above synopsis shows that Jackson County voters tended to fuvored Democratic judicial
candidates over Republicanjudicial candidates and is typical ofthe overall voting tendency ofJackson
County. Another way to test whether party is used as a cue for voting in judicial elections is to
examine voting in judicial elections where candidates are not free to discuss issues and to compare it

•
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to the party affiliation for the favored candidate in the high salience races and the party affiliation for
the favored candidate in judicial elections. (See Table Seven, page 33). This comparison will show
if voters "carry-over" voting behavior from high salience races to judicial races. Upon examination

ofthe data which shows very nominal differences in turnout, there is no true relationship here. This
may be accredited to the minimal number of studied election years in which partisan elections were
held.

HYPOTIIESIS FIVE

Judicial incumbents in partisan elections will be victorious.

•

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

There were four judicial partisan races where one candidate was an incumbent running to be elected
to his appointed seat. Every incumbent candidate proved victorious. (See Table Eight, page 36).
There could be interrelated factors at work here.

These same four incumbents were also

recommended by the Southern Illinoisan newspaper. Though it could be that the newspaper gives
preference to incumbents, relying on their experience to make them a good judge, a trait that voters
also tend to follow. In addition to this scenario, all the incumbentjudges were democrats, a factor that
could also influence voters in a traditionally democratic county.
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EXTERNAL STIJDY CONCLUSIONS

It is easy to see how the external influencing factors were first identified during prior research
ofjudicial elections. Upon comparing most of the election data, the relationship between factors is
quickly recognizable. The hypothesis that judicial election turnout will increase during presidential
elections was confirmed partially. It appears to be true that more voters turnout in presidential
election years, although we actually see more participants in retention elections in non-presidential
years. Another hypothesis that appears to be somewhat confirmed is that judicial candidates will not
be elected or retained if they receive an unfavorable rating from the Illinois State Bar Association.
Although the findings were not 100 percent perfect, there is evidence ofan influence on voters by bar
poll ratings. Even in retention elections, candidates seem to be retained by slimmer margins if they

•

receive unfavorable ratings. Also an influence on public opinion, media coverage might appear to
increase voter awareness. Thus, the hypothesis that media coverage will have a positive affect on
voter turnout injudicial partisan and retention elections could probably be confirmed. Although it can
be identified that Jackson County favors Democratic judicial candidates, it may be insufficient to
warrant support ofthe hypothesis that party affiliation is a cue to voters injudicial partisan elections.
The fina1 hypothesis that judicial incumbents in partisan elections will be victorious appears to have
somewhat strong support, with no incumbents having been voted out of office during the period
studied (1976 to 1988). From all the hypotheses and data studied, it does appear that overall Jackson
County may in fact follow noted norms ofjudicial elections.
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STUDY OF INTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS IN JACKSON COUNTY

As mentioned previously, voter turnout in Jackson County totaled 20,400 in the judicial
elections in 1988. This turnout is below the norms of53 percent for tbe state in presidential elections
at 41 percent ofthe 49,467 potentially eligible to vote. An examination ofthese statistics and the 1990
U.S. Census data may explain the reason for low turnout when looking into possible internal
influencing factors as education, gender, race, age, and income. A comparison ofexpected turnout
and actual turnout was conducted to see if Jackson County met normal voting conditions for each
internal voting fuctor. (See Appendix A, page 50).

However, it should be noted that this study is

extremely limited and offers little beyond conjecture. It merely uses averages from census data and
does not have any primary statistics to utilize. In order to study these factors in a more conclusive

•

manner which allows for correlations between the influencing fuctors and voter participation to be
drawn correctly, data would have to be gathered as to the actual characteristics ofthose who did vote
in the judicial elections selected for review. As this is not possible for elections that have already taken
place, a study was made of the averages and is limited in significance as mentioned above.

HYPOTHESIS ONE

Low voter turnout in Jackson County may be caused by a younger population than the state
and national norms that lives in the area due to the presence of Southern Illinois University.
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METIIOD AND ANALYSIS

When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A, it shows that there is a potential
electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. The number of people in each age group
shows 8,302 people aged 18 - 20 years (or 17 percent ofpotential electorate), 8,973 people aged 21
24 years (\ 8 percent), 9,818 people aged 25 - 34 years (20 percent), 7,268 people aged 35 - 44 years
(15 percent), 8,531 people aged 46 - 64 (17 percent), and 6,575 people aged 65 or older (13 percent).
Previous information discussed relating to previous participation of these age groups shows that
potential voters aged 18 - 20 years have voting participation rates of38.5 percent. Potential voters
aged 21 - 24 years have voting participation ratesof45.7 percent. Potential voters aged 25 - 34 years
have voting participation rates of 53.2 percent. Potential voters aged 35 - 44 years have voting

•

participation rates of63.6 percent. Potential voters aged 45 - 64 years have voting participation rates
of70 percent, and potential voters aged 65 and over have voting participation rates of 70.1 percent.
Therefore, statistically it can be expected that in Jackson County 3,196 people aged 18 - 20 years will
vote, 5,335 people aged 21 - 24 years will vote, 5,223 people aged 25 - 34 years will vote, 4,623
people aged 35 - 44 years, 5,971 people aged 45 - 64 years will vote, and 4609 people aged 65 and
over will vote. Thus, when applying national normal voting patterns to Jackson County could expect
a vote of28,957. The figures as previously mentioned for voting participation in the 1988 judicial
election in Jackson County was 20,400, a difference of8,557. Jackson County would meet the state
norm of53 percent ifthe additional 8,557 people had voted as expected. Ifthe population ofJackson
County was consistent with the national norm, the group with the highest population would be 25 
34 year, it is possible that this discrepancy would be made up. Thus, it may be possible that the cause
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of this low turnout in relation to the national average is caused by the larger young population who
are less likely to vote, taking low percentage possibilities ofturnout. Therefore, another county with
an older population could expect a larger turnout ifvoting followed national nonns. With almost 35
percent ofthe potential electorate being aged 24 years or younger, the effect on the total voter turnout
in Jackson County may therefore be expected to he lower than the national norm for as long as
younger people continue to vote less than older ones.

HYPOTHESIS TWO
A university town may have higher levels ofcollege educated people, which should therefore
translate into an increased voter turnout.

•

METHOD AND ANALYSIS

When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A, it shows that there is a potential
electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. The nwnber ofpeople in each education
range shows 3,376 people with 8 yrs or less ofschoo1ing (or 7 percent ofpotential electorate), 4,420
people aged with 9 to II years ofschooling (9 percent), 9,604 people with 12 years ofschooling (19
percent), 21,086 people with 1 - 3 years ofcollege, and 10,981 people with 4 plus years of college.
Average statistics discussed relating to previous participation ofthese educational groups show that
as education increases, so does the nwnber of people who vote in elections. These statistics are as
follows: people with 8 yrs or less ofschooling have average turnout rates of35.1 percent, people with
9 - II years ofschooling have average turnout rates of42.2 percent, people with 12 years ofschooling

•

-44

•

have average turnout rates of 57.5 percent, people with I - 3 years ofcollege have average turnout
rates of8.7 percent, and people with 4 plus years ofcollege have average turnout rates of81 percent.
Therefore, it could probably be expected that in Jackson County, an increase of voting participation
for those in the college-educated category would occur that would lead to more turnout, certainly a
turnout above national average, as a town in which a university is present certainly has a larger than
normal presence of college educated people. When applying national normal voting patterns to
Jackson County, the county could expect a vote of31 ,952. The figures as previously mentioned for
voting participation in the 1988judicial election in Jackson County was 20,400, a difference oft I,552.
Jackson County would meet the state norm of 53 percent if the additional 11,552 people had voted
as expected. It may be possible that the cause of this turnout discrepancy is the large numbers of
people who are in currently in college pursing an education. This situation has been determined to be

•

one in which people are more transient and therefore have a larger barrier to voting locally. Thus,
although a large proportion of the potential electorate in Jackson County has a college education
which should lead to larger voter turnout, the fact that many ofthem are transient and still studying
leads to less turnout, with more restrictions are placed on the ability of those people to vote. The
effect on the total voter turnout in Jackson County may therefore be expected to be lower than the
national norm for as long as people attending college are less likely to vote than those who are not
pursuing an education. (See Table Three, page 25).
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HYPOTHESIS THREE

As Jackson County is located in a rural area, turnout will be lower than the national average

due to the generally lower income associated with its geography and population.

METHOD AND ANALYSIS

When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A, it shows that there is a potential
electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. In order to examine income, however, the·
number of households is counted rather than individuals. The number of households in Jackson
County who have an income of$15,OOO or less is 10,484. This figure is an astonishing 47 percent of

•

the number of the 23,491 households counted. The median income for Jackson County is $17,500
to $19,999. National average participation of income groups shows that 40 % of people with and
income of$15,000 vote, whereas 70 percent ofthose with incomes of$50,000 or more vote. Thus,
it can be expected that in Jackson County the turnout would be lower than the state average ifpeople

followed traditional patterns for voting behavior. The figures as previously mentioned for voting
participation in the 1988 judicial election in Jackson County was 20,400, only 41 percent of those
eligible to vote, but almost exactly the figure that could be expected from a low income population.
Jackson County would meet the state norm of53 percent ifthe income median was increased. Thus,
another county with a population that has a higher income, such as Cook County could expect a larger
turnout ifvoting followed national norms. The effect on the total voter turnout in Jackson County of
having residents with low incomes would be that oflowering the expected turnout.
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HYPOlHESIS FOUR
Race and gender have no significant influence on voter turnout in Jackson County.

METHOD AND ANALYSIS

When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A (page50), it shows that there is a
potential electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. 51 percent ofthese are male and
49 percent ofthese are female. 85 percent ofthese are white, and 15 percent ofthese are minorities.
Previous figures determine that women now vote more than men, and minorities vote less than whites.
Thus, it could possibly be expected that in Jackson County the turnout would be higher than the
national average if people followed traditional patterns for voting behavior. The figures as previously

•

mentioned for voting participation in the 1988 judicial election in Jackson County was 20,400, only
41 percent ofthose eligible to vote, not the higher figure that could be expected from a predominantly
white population. In relation to gender, however, the presence ofalmost equal men and women in the
county indicates that voter turnout should be higher, as nationally the population consists of more
women than men. Thus, another county with a more racially mixed, gender norm population could
expect a lower turnout if voting followed national norms. The effect on the total voter turnout in
Jackson County of having residents who are white and equally male and female should be a positive
effect on turnout, not the negative 12 percent less ofthe state average that has occurred.
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INTERNAL STUDY CONCLUSIONS

It is easy to see how the internal influencing factors were first identified during prior research

of judicial elections. Upon comparing most of the election and U.S. Census data, the relationship
between factors appears to be quickly recognizable, and Jackson County appears to fit the norms as
far as voting averages in the different internal influencing groups are concerned. However, it must be
noted that this study of internal influencing factors in Jackson County is extremely limited and offers
little beyond conjecture. It merely takes averages from census data and does not have any primary
statistics to rely on as to who actually did physically vote in each judicial election. In order to study
these factors in a more conclusive manoer which allows for correlations between the influencing
factors and voter participation to be drawn correctly, data would have to be gathered as to the actual

•

characteristics ofthose who did vote in the judicial elections selected for review. This is certainly not
possible for elections that have already occurred, but most certainly will be in the future. Specifically
a actual survey of those who vote would have to be conducted as to the characteristics that one
wishes to review of penple who are leaving a polliog station. Under these conditions, it may be
possible to correctly identifY internal influencing fuctors in Illioois. Until then, research into these
internal influencing factors should not be taken as accurate or significant.

CONCLUSION OF STUDY IN JACKSON COUNTY

A complete examination of voter and census data in Jackson County indicates that some
factors may negatively or positively influence turnout and participation, as well as determine who will
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be victorious in each election. It is possible to track external factors such as media coverage of the
election to internal factors such as educational level, and when examined in Jackson County it appears
that some factors may influence the electorate more extensively than others. In the case ofexternal
factors, it appears that voter turnout is more easily swayed by media coverage and the national
importance ofother voting opportunities being conducted at the time of the election. In the case of
internal factors, data to correctly examine the influence ofthese factors on voter participation is not
readily available. Conclusions can only be drawn on averages, an extremely limited study. It must
therefore be determined that internal influencing factors in Jackson County cannot be significantly
determined with available data without drawing conclusions from insufficient data When trying to
determine whether participation is at high enough levels to justifY using the election method in Jackson
County alone, with a 41 percent voter turnout, it appears that without a majority vote, it is possible
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that it may not be an effective method. Probably at least a majority turnout of 50 percent or greater,
that is half of the potential electorate in the county, could possibly be considered enough. A turnout
such as this may show that the election method of judicial selection is indeed based on popular
election. Until then, people who argue democratic theory in support ofthe judicial selection method
ofelection in place in Illinois will find no support in the data that I reviewed.

CONCLUSION

As previously noted, the United States Constitution extended powers to the Judiciary branch

as the third and final branch in its creation ofa government. With the extension ofthese powers and
the further extension offull faith and credit to each individual state in the country, the federaljudiciary
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and the judiciary in each state has tremendous responsibilities. With each state making its own laws
in relation to judicial selection within their state, concurrence at to the best method ofselection is not
evidenced. There are many methods that have both been used and evolved over time.
Each state in the country has a detailed history as to their choice ofjudicial selection method.
These methods have evolved as the philosophies ofhow the country should be governed has changed,
from the view that the state legislature is best qualified to select judges to the philosophy that
government is strictly by consent, and that should include judges also. The selection method of
election has been chosen in Illinois and has many supporters and also much opposition. It has not been
without controversy that Illinois chose to adopt this method. It has also not been without controversy
that Illinois chose to keep this method during its last constitutional convention and supporters ofboth
methods continue to debate which system is best.

•

Looking at this issue on a local county leve~ one finds that participation in the election process
is not necessarily representative of the people as declared by election method proponents. A further
study into factors that influence voter participation may allow for some consideration of why the
electorate choose not to vote, but many factors remain difficult to examine. One point may be certain,
however, a system that relies on popular election cannot probably remain effective if voter
participation continues to decline, the functionality of the system is most likely impaired.
The method ofjudicial selection in each state is determined by the legislation of that state in

their constitution. The different methods have evolved over history to present time, although the
methods themselves have not changed, each methods popularity has. The system of election that
Illinois has chosen has often been attacked by the reform movement, especially as the local electorate
participates less and less, and political parties and affiJiated associations exert pressure for change and
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participate more. Many see national unification as the answer, which may be the case, as a unified
system is less easily questioned than an individual one. What is certain, however, is that the debate

will continue whichever system is chosen. 11lis debate should probably be driven by data and by
objective standards as opposed to attachment to democratic principles.

•
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APPENDIX A
ruDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
YEAR

•

JUDGE

RETAIN JUDGE?
YES
NO

%
YES

MEAN
VOTER

1976

Clayton
Kunce
Lewis

11,547
12,843
11,652

3,497
4,349
3,356

77
77
78

15,041
16,733
15,008

15,594

1978

Chase
Oros

6,170
6,605

2,692
2,840

70
74

8,862
8,905

8,884

1980

Goldenhersch
Richman
Howell

10,059
11,175
9,890

4,468
5,384
4,443

69
68
69

14,527
16,559
14,333

15,139

1982

Lewis
Bigler
Green

9,146
8,503
9,465

3,307
3,610
3,612

73
70
78

12,553
12,113
12,077

12,247

1984

Henshaw
Williamson
Spomer
Oros
Karns
Jones

11,754
11,858
11,635
11,557
11,889
12,455

4,662
4,564
4,841
4,816
5,161
4,756

72
72
71
70
70
72

16,416
16,422
16,476
16,473
17,050
17,211

16,674

1986

Richman
Howell
Haney
Howerton
Lowery
South X

6,995
7,378
7,673
7,810
7,277
6,791

5,795
3,417
3,080
2,922
3,088
4,944

55
68
71
72
70
58

12,790
10,795
10,753
10,732
10,365
11,735

11,195

1988

Lewis
Bigler

12,291
11,187

3,344
2,914

79
75

15,635
15,001

15,318

*X

*

Barely received recommendation from Illinois Bar Association
Strongly Not Recommended by Illinois Bar Association

All candidates received recommendation from the Southern Illinoisan

•

TOTAL VOTES
CAST
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APPENDIXB
1990 US CENSUS DATA

Jackson County

PERSONS
Universe: Persons
Total

.

61,067

.

23,491

HOUSEHOLDS
Universe: Households
Total

SEX
Universe: Persons

•

Male

.

Female

.

RACE
Universe: Persons
White
.
Black
.
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut
.
Asian or Pacific
..................................................
Other race
.
AGE
Universe: Persons
Under 1 year
1 and 2 years
3 and 4 years
5 years
.........................................................
6 years
.........................................................
7 to 9 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 and II years
12 and 13 years
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
14 years
.........................................................
15 years
.........................................................
16 years
.........................................................

•
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31,396
29,671

51,991
6,342

109
2,178
447

598
1,409
1,355
692
691
2,048
1,306
1,210
574
552
585

•

•

•

17 years
.
18 years
.
19 years
.
20 years
.
21 years
.
.
22 to 24 years
25 to 29 years
.
30 to 34 years
.
35 to 39 years
.
40 to 44 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45 to 49 years
.
50 to 54 years
.
55 to 59 years
.
60 to 62 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
62 to 64 years
65 to 69 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70 to 74 years
.
75 to 79 years
.
80 to 84 years
.
85 years and over
.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Universe: Persons 18 years and over
.. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . ..
..
.
Less than 9th grade
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
.
.
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
.
Some college, no degree
.
Associate degree
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Bachelor's degree
.
.
Graduate or professional degree

HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1989
Universe: Households
Less than $5,000
$5,000 to $9,999
$10,000 to $12,499
$12,500 to $14,999
$15,000 to $17,499
$17,500 to $19,999
$20,000 to $22,499
$22,500 to $24,999
$25,000 to $27,499

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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580
1,890
3,168
3,244
3,151
5,822
5,409
4,409
3,870
3,398
2,559
2,051
1,913

779
1,229
1,888
1,637
1,432
912
706

3,376
4,420
9,604
16,959
4,127
6,415
4,566

3,765
3,938
1,409
1,372
1,231
1,140
1,021
889
987

•

$27,500 to $29,999
$30,000 to $32,499
$32,500 to $34,999
$35,000 to $37,499
$37,500 to $39,999
$40,000 to $42,499
$42,500 to $44,999
$45,000 to $47,499
$47,500 to $49,999
$50,000 to $54,999
$55,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $74,999
$75,500 to $99,999
$100,000 to $124,999
$125,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more

666
840
538
650
444
474
381
430
430
559
453
958
531
157
106
122

•

•
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BAA

OFAC1AL BALLOT· GENERAL ELECTION
JACKSON CQUNTY,lLUN01S - NOVEMBER 5. 1996

BALLOT FOR JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
SEEKING RETENTION IN OFFICE

)FACE."

CIRCUIT COURT JUOCiE
,HALL

GEORGE OROS be retalnedl" office lit Juooe OF THE

MICHAEL J. HENSHAW be _ _ " _
UDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FIRST JUDICtAl CIRCum

'HAlL

'HALL JAMES

..

R. WILLIAMSON be .,..... , , _ ..

UOGE OF TIiE CIRCUIT ~RT FIRST JUDICIAL CIRcum

;HAlL STEPHEN

L SPOMER be rfltalned In alb;lS JUDGe

)F THE CIRCUIT COURT FIRST JUDICiAl CIRCUIT?

;HAl.L PAUL $. MURPHY be rfllU!ed lnotTlce •• JUDl)E OF
'HE ClRCUITCOURT FIRST JUOIC!AL CIRCUIT?

~

h

OFFICIAL BALLOT· GENERAL ELECTION
JACKSON COUNTY,ILLINOIS· NOVEMBER 5. 1996

l . . ."."

JACKSON COUNTY

VOTE ONTHE PROPOSmONWITH RESPECTTO AU OR ANY OFTHE JUDGES USTED
)N THIS BAllOT. NO JUDGE LISTED IS RUNNING AGJI.INST ANY OTHER JUDGE. THE
;OLE auESTlON IS WHETHER EACH JUDGE SHALL BE RETAINED IN HIS PRESENT

:rRCUIT COURT FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCV\T1

•

YES

Shall the Property rax Extension Umitatlon Law (35 ILeS 200118-185 through 18-245),
which limits annuaJ property tax extension increases, apply to non-home rule taXing
districts with all or a portion of their equalized assessed valuation located in the County
of Jackson?

122-+

NO

123-+

YES

140~

YES

124-+

NO

141~

NO

125-+

YES

126-+

NO

127-+

YES

12B-+

NO

129-+

YES

130-+

NO

131-+

SPECIMEN SAl
GENERAL ELE(

JACKSON COUNTY, ILLII
ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEM8

~~'

c::::

I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING SPECIMENT BALL{
OFFICIAL BALLOT TO BE useD IN THE GENERAL E
JACKSON COUNTY. ILLINOIS. TUESOAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1
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